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JURISDICTION 
This case is on appeal from a final order entered August 13, 2002 by Judge 
William L. Bohling, Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. Jurisdiction of this appellate Court is appropriate under Utah Code Ann. §78-
2A-3(2)(j)(2001). The Supreme Court of Utah transferred these proceedings to the 
Appeal Court by order dated October 23, 2002, pursuant Utah Code Ann. §78-2-
2(4)(2001). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Under the governing language of Utah Code Ann. §31-A-309(l)(b)(1985), 
did the trial Court err by refusing to grant Appellant's motion to amend judgment by 
eliminating the offset of personal injury protection [PIP] benefits against the special 
damages award? 
Standard of Review: 
The trial Court's ruling allowing the PIP benefit offset against the special 
damages award is a decision on statutory construction which must be reviewed by the 
Court of Appeals for correctness, for which the trial Court's conclusions of law are 
given no difference. See Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Audit Division, 938 P.2d 266, 
267 (Utah 1997). 
2. Did the trial Court err in refusing to grant Appellant's motion to amend the 
judgement to eliminate the double application of the 10% reduction for contributory 
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negligence from Plaintiffs award of damages, where evidence substantiated the jury 
had already applied the reduction? 
Standard of Review: 
This issue presents mixed questions of law and fact that must be reviewed for 
abuse of discretion in applying the law to the facts. See Woodhaven Apartments v. 
Washington, 942 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1997). 
3. Did the trail Court err in refusing to grant Plaintiffs costs? 
Standard of Review: 
The trail Court decision regarding costs is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto, Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, 
432 Utah Adv. Reporter 44-P.3d-(Utah 2001). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE 
INTERPRETATION IS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
The prevailing statutory basis in this case is the no-fault section of the 
insurance code. Previous case law precedent was based on the original no-fault 
statute adopted by the Utah Legislature in 1973. The enlire insurance code, including 
its no-fault provisions, was repealed in 1985 and replaced with the current code. 
Changes in the current no-fault provisions of the insurance code dissolved the 
statutory basis for treatment of personal injury protection [PIP] benefits, a core issue 
in this case. Both the 1973 code (repealed) and the 1985 code, as subsequently 
amended, are quoted below for ease of comparing the differences. 
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Previous Insurance Code 
Utah Code Ann. §3141-9(2) (1973) 
(l)No person for whom direct benefit 
coverage is provided for in this act 
shall be allowed to maintain a cause 
of action for general damages arising 
out of personal injuries alleged to 
have been caused by an automobile 
accident except where there has been 
caused by this accident any one or 
more of the following: 
(a) Death; 
(b) Dismemberment fracture; 
(c) Permanent disability; 
(d) Permanent disfigurement; 
or, 
(e) Medical expenses to a 
person in excess of $500. 
(2) The owner of a motor vehicle 
with respect to which security is 
required by this act who fails to have 
such security in effect at the time of 
an accident shall have no immunity 
from tort liability and shall be 
personally liable for the payment of 
the benefits provided under section 6 
of this act. 
Current Insurance Code 
Utah Code Ann §31A-22-309 (2001) 
(l)(a) A person who has or is required 
to have direct benefit coverage under a 
policy which includes personal injury 
protection may not maintain a cause of 
action for general damages caused by 
an automobile accident, except where 
the person has sustained one or more 
of the following: 
(i) death; 
(ii) dismemberment; 
(iii) permanent disability or 
permanent impairment based 
upon objective findings; 
(iv) permanent disfigurement; 
or 
(v) medical expenses to a 
person in excess of $3,000. 
(b) Subsection (l)(a) does not apply 
to persons making an uninsured 
motorist claim. 
(2)(a) An insurer issuing personal 
injury protection coverage under this 
part may only exclude . . . & etc. 
Neither the language nor the substance in paragraph 2 (above) of the 1973 no-
fault code appears anywhere else in the current insurance statute. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, INTRODUCTION 
The complaint in this case, filed September 22, 2000, sought damages for the 
Plaintiffs suffering and medical expenses incurred in an August 28, 1997 
automobile accident caused by the Defendant, who turned his automobile left in 
front of the plaintiff, failing to yield and causing the collision. 
B. SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The case was tried to a jury April 2-4, 2000. The jury returned its special 
verdict, awarding special damages in the amount of $5,126 and general damages in 
the amount of $10,000. The Court first reduced both the special damages and 
general damages by 10% based upon the jury verdict assigning Plaintiff contributory 
negligence of 10%. The Court then offset the special damages by an additional 
$3,565.47, the amount that the Plaintiff had received in PIP benefits. Judgement 
was ultimately entered on April 29, 2000 in favor of the Plaintiff and against the 
Defendant in the amount of $10,047.93. On May 6, 2000 the Plaintiff filed a motion 
to amend the judgement. After briefing and oral argument, the trial Court denied the 
Plaintiffs motion to amend the judgement, pursuant to an order entered on August 
14, 2002. The Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on September 10, 2002. 
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On August 28, 1997, Plaintiff was traveling west on 1300 South in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, approaching the 900 West intersection. Defendant was eastbound 
on 1300 South, positioned in the left turning lane at 900 West. Plaintiff had the 
right-of-way as she entered the 900 West intersection, but Defendant turned 
immediately in front of her, causing their vehicles to collide. Plaintiff sustained 
injuries; her car was a total loss. 
2. At trial, Plaintiff established that she had incurred medical expenses of 
$3,565.47. The Defendant, Lowell Isom, paid no portion of that amount. 
3. On April 3, 2002, the jury received its instructions (Addendum, Exhibit 1), 
and the special verdict form (Addendum, Exhibit 2) from the Court. 
4. At noon on April 4*\ the jury submitted a note to the Court during 
deliberations, which said: "Do we account for the effect of joint negligence or does 
the Court?" (Addendum, Exhibit 3) 
5. The Court answered this note, stating: "Please complete the special 
verdict form exactly as written in accordance with your answers as you proceed 
through the form." (Addendum, Exhibit 3). 
6. The jury concluded its deliberations at approximately 1:10 p.m. on April 
4th. The verdict divided comparative negligence between Defendant (90%) and 
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Plaintiff (10%). The Plaintiff was awarded $5,126 in special damages and $10,000 
in general damages (see Addendum, Exhibit 2). 
7. In the judgement, the Court applied a 10% reduction to the special 
damages award of $5,126, decreasing the amount to $4,613.40. The Court applied a 
10%o reduction to the general damages award of $10,000, decreasing it to $9,000. 
8. The Court's judgement further reduced the special damages award by 
$3,565.47, the amount of Plaintiff s PIP benefits, subtracting that amount from the 
$4,613.40 to a final total of $1,047.93. 
9. The Court entered the judgment on April 29, 2003. Plaintiff filed a 
verified memorandum of costs May 3, 2001 in the amount of $863.43. 
10. After briefing and hearing, the Court denied Plaintiffs timely-filed 
motion to amend the judgement to recover the amount of PIP benefits in the special 
damages award and to recognize that the jury had already applied Plaintiffs 10% 
negligence allocation to its damages awards before the Court did so a second time. 
The Court also disallowed Plaintiff any costs. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In its ruling, the District Court relied upon the Utah Supreme Court's decision 
in Allstate Insurance Company v. Ivie 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980) and the Supreme 
Court decision of Dupuis v. Niels on 624 P.2d 685 (Utah 1980). The substance of the 
Ivie decision allowed a grant of partial tort immunity to a tort-feasor, holding that 
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there was no personal liability for the PIP benefits paid by an insurer. Both decisions 
were based upon language of the insurance code that no longer exists. In 1985, the 
Utah Legislature repealed the former language of Section 31-41-9(2) of the Utah 
Code. The new language removed the section upon which the Court inferred in Ivie 
a comparable grant of partial immunity due the tort-feasor and provided no other 
statutory basis, either direct or implied, upon which this prior reasoning could be 
upheld. The Utah Legislature reversed the statutory basis of this decision. The 
District Court below must be reversed to conform likewise. There is no longer any 
foundation in the statute to justify reducing Plaintiffs special damages award by the 
amount of the PIP benefit. 
The jury allocated to Plaintiff 10% of the negligence for the accident. The 
District Court failed to recognize from the evidence, that the jury had applied a 10% 
reduction to Plaintiffs general and special damages awards in its verdict. There are 
three elements to this evidence: (1) The trial Court had given the jury a clear 
instruction to comprehend contributory negligence in its calculation of damages 
awarded to Plaintiff; (2) The special verdict form followed the logical sequence of 
that explanation from the jury instruction; and, (3) During its deliberations, the jury 
sent the Court a note, specifically asking: f,Do we account for the effect of joint 
negligence or does the Court?" The trial Court responded with this direction: 
"Please complete the special verdict form exactly as written, in accordance with 
your answers as you proceed through the form." 
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These are the sole elements of evidence on this issue. The jury instruction 
explained the principle of dividing negligence between Defendant and Plaintiff and 
provided a thorough example of how to calculate damages in the event of divided 
negligence. In its order of questions, the special verdict form provided the 
mechanism for the jury to determine and assign negligence on a percentage basis. 
Immediately following the question dividing negligence between Plaintiff (10%) 
and Defendant (90%) is the last question of the form: "What amount would fairly 
compensate plaintiff for the injuries proximately caused by the accident?" To this 
question, the jury filled in the amounts for special damages and general damages. 
In the case of Bishop v. GenTec, Inc, 48 P.3d 218 (Utah 2002), the Supreme 
Court recognized appropriate circumstances in which a jury has already taken into 
account the reduction for comparative negligence in its award of damages. The jury 
in this case was preoccupied with its responsibility for applying the comparative 
negligence assigned to the Plaintiff in awarding damages. In answering the "fairly 
compensate Plaintiff question of the special verdict form, the jury took into account 
the 10% reduction and hence under Bishop, supra the trial Court should not have 
reduced the award a second time. 
The trial Court entered the judgment in Plaintiffs favor April 29, 2002. 
Plaintiff filed a verified memorandum of cost May 3, 2002. Included was a $250 
expense for mediation the trial Court had ordered. Defendant made no dispute of 
Plaintiffs costs except the $250 for mediation. The trial Court heard argument 
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concerning the mediation cost at the hearing on Plaintiffs motion to amend the 
judgment for recovery of the PIP offset and the 10% reduction for comparative 
negligence. The trial Court ruled Plaintiff was not entitled to the $250 mediation 
cost. In the order denying Plaintiffs motion to amend however, the Court 
disallowed Plaintiff all of her costs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO AMEND 
THE JUDGEMENT TO ELIMINATE THE PIP OFFSET 
BECAUSE THE STATUTORY BASIS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT'S IVIE DECISION WAS REPEALED IN THE 1985 
REPEAL OF THE INSURANCE CODE AND COMMON LAW 
CONFERRED NO RIGHT OF OFFSET TO DEFENDANT 
SINCE HE DID NOT PAY THE PIP BENEFITS. 
In Allstate Insurance Company v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980) the Utah 
Supreme Court construed the then-existing Utah No-Fault Insurance Act to provide 
for the means whereby an insured tort-feasor, such as the Defendant, did not have 
any personal liability for payment of PIP benefits. The Court did so by the following 
language: 
Section 2 of the act provides: 
The purpose of this act is to require the payment of certain 
prescribed benefits in respect to motor vehicle accidents through 
either insurance or other approved security, but on the basis of no 
fault, preserving, however, the right of an injured person to pursue 
the customary tort claims where the most serious type of injuries 
occur. . . 
(1) No person for whom direct benefit 
coverage is provided for in this act shall be allowed to 
maintain a cause of action for general damages arising 
out of personal injuries alleged to have been caused 
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by an automobile accident except where there has 
been caused by this accident anyone or more of the 
following: 
(a) Death; 
(b) Dismemberment or fracture; 
(c) Permanent disability; or 
(d) Medical expenses to a person in excess of 
$500. 
(2)The owner of a motor vehicle with respect 
to which security is required by this act who fails to 
have such security in effect at the time of an accident 
shall have no immunity from tort liability and shall be 
personally liable for the payment of the benefits 
provided for under Section 31-41-6. [Emphasis 
added] 
Under this statutory plan, first party PIP benefits up to the 
amount provided in Section 6 are paid to an injured person without 
regard to fault. Furthermore, the injured party is precluded from 
maintaining an action to recover general damages (all damages 
other than those awarded for economic loss), except where the 
threshold requirements of Section 9(1) are met. Under Section 9(2), 
there are two consequences to the owner of a motor vehicle who 
fails to have the security required by Section 5: first, he has no 
immunity from tort liability; second, he is personally liable for the 
benefits provided under Section 6. The only logical inference is that 
if a party has the security required under Section 5, the no-fault 
insurance act confers two privileges: first, he is granted partial Tort 
immunity; second, his not personally liable for the benefits provided 
under Section 6. ( See: Ivie, supra 606 P.2d at 1199-1200.) 
The Supreme Court interpreted this statute with the only logical inference of 
the then-existing statutory language, that an insured tort-feasor would be free of 
personal liability for the PIP benefits. In the 1981 decision of Dupuis v. Nielson, 624 
P.2d 685 (Utah 1981), the Supreme Court endorsed a method of handling the PIP 
benefits issue in a jury trial similar to that used by the trial Court below in this case. 
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Specifically, the Supreme Court refused to reverse the trial Court's decision to allow 
evidence of the total medical expenses to be presented to the jury, but then provided for 
an offset of the special damages by the amount of PIP benefits paid to the Plaintiff. The 
Dupuis, supra, decision, which was based upon the Ivie analysis, was proper under the 
then-existing statute. 
In 1985 the Utah State legislature adopted a revision of the entire insurance code. 
In this revision, the statutory basis of Ivie, supra, was eliminated. Pursuant to that 
change, Utah Code Ann. 31-41-9(2)(1953) was replaced with the following language of 
Utah Code Ann. 31A-22-302(b)(1985): 
Utah Code Ann. 
31-41-9(2)(1973) 
2) The owner of a motor vehicle 
with respect to which security is 
required by this act who fails to 
have such security in effect at the 
time of an accident shall have no 
immunity from tort liability and 
shall be personally liable for the 
payment of the benefits provided 
under section 6 of this act. 
Utah Code Ann. 
lA-22-302(b)(1985) 
(b) Subsection (lXa) does not apply to a 
person making an uninsured motorist 
claim. 
In making this change, the Utah Legislature eliminated the language 
"shall be personally liable for the payment of the benefits provided for under 
section. . ." 31-41-6, which was the basis of the Ivie, supra, decision. The statutory 
revision took away the foundation of PIP benefit immunity for an insured tort-
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feasor. The current language of the statute is unambiguous and therefore its plain 
language should be applied, a doctrine of interpretation the Utah Supreme Court 
has firmly entrenched. See Blackner v. State, 48 P.3d 949 (Utah 2001). 
The trial Court overlooked this statutory change and the resulting 
dissolution of the Defendant's grant of tort-feasor partial immunity for PIP benefits 
that was reserved under the prior language. The trial Court should have recognized 
that without the statutory protection provided by the prior language, the Defendant, 
who did not personally pay any of Plaintiffs medical expenses, had no right of 
offset and was liable for these special damages awarded by the jury. The Supreme 
Court has devised definite criteria for grounding the right of subrogee offset. 
Defendant meets none of them. See State Farm Mut. v. Northwestern Nat. Ins., 912 
P.2d 983 (Utah 1996). In refusing to modify the judgement to set aside the offset, 
the trial Court erred and this Court should correct that error by reversing the trial 
Court's decision on the treatment of PIP benefits. 
H. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE 
JURY HAD ALREADY APPLIED THE 10% REDUCTION OF 
DAMAGES FOR THE PLAINTIFFS COMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED A 
SECOND 10% REDUCTION. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Bishop v. GenTec Inc., 48 P.3d 218 (Utah 
2002) recognized that under appropriate circumstances, a trial court should adjust a 
judgement to recognize that a jury has already applied the comparative negligence 
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award reduction and not reduce the award a second time. This is just such a case 
and the trial Court below committed error in not amending the judgement to 
account for the second reduction of the award. This Court must look to the 
evidence to determine the legitimate foundation of this issue. There are three parts 
to this evidence: (1) jury instruction; (2) the special verdict form; and (3) the 
content of a note exchanged between the judge and jury. 
The jury in this case below was given the following instruction for 
comprehending comparative negligence in its verdict: 
If you find that the Defendant was negligent, you may 
decide if the Plaintiff was also negligent. If the Plaintiff was 
negligent, and the Plaintiffs negligence was a proximate cause 
of the Plaintiffs own injury, the Plaintiffs negligence must be 
compared to the negligence of the Defendant. 
A Plaintiff whose negligence is less than 50% of the 
total negligence caused by Plaintiffs injury, may still recover 
compensation, but the amount will be reduced by the amount 
of Plaintiffs negligence. If the Plaintiffs negligence is equal 
to or greater than the negligence of the Defendant, then the 
Plaintiff may recover nothing. For example if you find the 
Plaintiffs negligence was 30% of all negligence causing the 
injury, then the Plaintiffs recovery would be reduced by 30%. 
On the other hand, if you find that the Plaintiffs negligence is 
50%) or greater, then the Plaintiff will recover nothing. 
The special verdict form was simple and provided an uncomplicated 
mechanism to unambiguously develop the intent of this jury instruction for 
comprehending comparative negligence with its sequence of only six questions, 
which the jury answered as follows: 
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MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions. If six of you 
are persuaded by the evidence in favor of the question, 
answer it "yes." If, on the question, six of you are not so 
persuaded, or if you are persuaded by the evidence against 
the question presented, answer it "no." 
1. Was the defendant negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes X _ No 
(If you answered No. 1 above "no," then go no 
further and return to the courtroom.) 
2. If you answered No. 1 above "yes," was such 
negligence a proximate cause of the accident? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
(If you answered No. 2 above "no," then go no 
further and return to the courtroom.) 
3. Was the plaintiff negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
4. If you answered No. 3 above "yes," was such 
negligence a proximate cause of the accident? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
5. If you answered "yes" to Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 
above, then what percentage of the negligence should be 
allocated to defendant, and what percentage of negligence 
should be allocated to plaintiff? 
Plaintiff 10 % 
Defendant 90 % 
(Total must equal 100%) 
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6. What amount would fairly compensate plaintiff for the 
injuries proximately caused by the accident? 
Special Damages $ 5,126°° 
General Damages $ 10,000°° 
The jury instruction explained the principle of dividing negligence 
between Defendant and Plaintiff by elucidating the option that the jury could find 
both the Plaintiff and the Defendant negligent in the "proximate cause of the 
Plaintiffs own injury. . ." 
The example furnished further reinforcement to the intent of 'whether 
and how5 the jury was instructed to conform its verdict for comprehending 
comparative negligence in the amount, if any, of a damage award. The language of 
the jury instruction is specific. That specificity is germane to reasoning an accurate 
conclusion : 
A Plaintiff whose negligence is less than 50% of the 
total negligence caused by the Plaintiffs injury, may still 
recover compensation, but the amount will be reduced by the 
amount of Plaintiff s negligence. [Emphasis added] 
This sentence is evidence that the jury understood there was a direct 
relationship between the percentage of Plaintiff s negligence and the compensation 
amount Plaintiff might recover. 
If the Plaintiffs negligence is equal to or greater than 
the negligence of the Defendant, then the Plaintiff may 
recover nothing. [Emphasis added] 
This succeeding sentence is further evidence that it was the jury's duty to 
compare the negligence of the Plaintiff to the negligence of the Defendant and 
award the Plaintiff nothing if her percentage exceeded his. Hence, the amount of 
her award would be nothing. The jury instruction proceeds to confirm this 
understanding with a precise example of how the principle is applied: 
For example, if you find the Plaintiffs negligence was 
30% of all negligence causing the injury, then the Plaintiffs 
recovery would be reduced by 30%. [Emphasis added] 
The example demonstrates again, with specific language, that it was 
the jury's duty to first establish negligence, then divide it on a percentage basis 
between Defendant and Plaintiff, then reduce Plaintiffs recovery by the percentage 
of negligence assigned her. The overall logical intent of the instruction example is 
bolstered by this last sentence: 
On the other hand, if you find that the Plaintiffs 
negligence is 50% or greater, then the Plaintiff will recover 
nothing. [Emphasis added] 
Evidence establishes that the substance of the jury instruction for 
calculating damages conferred upon the jury the responsibility for reducing 
Plaintiffs damage award by the percentage of comparative negligence assigned 
her. 
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The language is specific in relating the percentage of negligence to the 
amount of recovery, indicating that comparative negligence of 30% meant recovery 
was reduced by 30%, and finishing with the direction that if Plaintiff s negligence 
exceeded 50%, she would recover nothing, an amount of zero. 
There is evidence that the jury was preoccupied with the question of 
whether it was responsible for applying the comparative negligence reduction 
assigned to Plaintiff in calculating her damages. At noon on April 4th, the jury 
exchanged notes with the judge on the subject The jury's note read: "Do we 
account for the effect of the joint negligence or does the Court?" The Court 
properly responded with the following additional instruction: "Please complete the 
special verdict form exactly as written, in accordance with your answers as you 
proceed through the form.iy 
Evidence establishes the jury gave serious consideration to applying 
Plaintiffs 10% share of comparative negligence to the damage award, a question 
significant enough to prompt a note for clarification to the Court. The jury had 
been deliberating at least four hours before submitting the question. It apparently 
had already determined the comparative negligence division between Defendant 
and Plaintiff by that time and was in the process of computing damages, or the 
question would not have been prompted. The only remaining question for the jury 
to decide was the amount of Plaintiffs damages. Another 70 minutes elapsed 
before that decision was finalized and the jury notified the Court it had reached a 
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verdict. Evidence establishes the jury gave considerable time to ensuring the 
correct method of calculating Plaintiffs damages, which included their clear 
instruction to apply Plaintiffs percentage of comparative negligence to the amount 
of damages awarded. Absent other language to the contrary in the instructions, or 
evidence the jury followed another course, no other conclusion is reasonable. 
Under such circumstances, the trial Court should not have made a second 
10% reduction and should have amended the judgement when timely requested to 
do so. This Court should recognize the error of the trial Court and utilize the 
discretion given it by the Bishop, supra decision to reverse that error and instruct 
the trial Court to award judgement for the full $5,126 in special damages and 
$10,000 in general damages. 
ffl. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF S COSTS. 
The trial Court entered the judgment April 29, 2002. Plaintiffs verified 
memorandum of costs under Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was 
filed timely on May 3, 2002 in the amount of $863.43. That total included $250.00 
for mediation costs, mediation the Court had ordered in advance of trail. This 
Court has previously held that an award of mediation as cost, is within the 
discretion of a trial court. See: Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 977 P.2d 508 
(Utah App. 1999) Defendant did not dispute any of Plaintiff s costs except the $250 
for mediation. 
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When Plaintiff filed the motion to amend the judgment to recover the PIP 
offset and the double application of the 10% comparative negligence reduction, the 
trial Court heard argument concerning only the $250 mediation cost and denied 
granting Plaintiff this cost. 
In its order denying Plaintiffs motion to amend the judgment, the trial 
Court denied Plaintiff all her costs, not just the mediation expense. This total denial 
of costs, both for court-ordered mediation and other undisputed costs, is an abuse of 
discretion which requires this Court to reverse the trial Court. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should recognize that the 1985 change in the Insurance statute 
eliminated the statutory basis for the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Allstate 
Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980) on the issue of PIP benefit/partial 
immunity for the Defendant. The trial Court's decision to allow an offset of the 
special damages was without a basis because there is no current statutory 
foundation for it. Further, since the Defendant did not pay the PIP benefits himself, 
he has no right of offset at common law or under Supreme Court precedent of State 
Farm Mut. v. Northwestern Nat. Ins., 912 P.2d 983 (Utah 1996). This Court should 
reverse this error and direct the trial Court to amend the judgement accordingly. 
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This case is similar to Bishop v. GenTec Inc., 48 P.3d 218(Utah 2002), in 
which it is clear from evidence in the record that the jury applied Plaintiffs 
comparative negligence to her damages awards. In such cases, the trial Court 
should not make a second reduction and the trial Court's refusal to amend the 
judgement and eliminate the second reduction was error. This Court should reverse 
that error and direct the trial Court to amend the judgement accordingly. 
The trail Court below abused is discretion by not awarding the Plaintiff 
her costs, including costs of mediation. 
DATED: March 3, 2003 
wan 
Duane H. Gillman 
McDowell & Gillman, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of March 2003,1 caused to be placed in 
the United States Mail, via first class, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies 
of the within and foregoing Brief of Appellant to: 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON 
Post Office Box 112350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 1 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
If you find that the defendant was negligent, you must decide if the plaintiff was 
also negligent If the plaintiff was negligent and the plaintiffs negligence was a proximate cause 
of the plaintiffs own injuries, the plaintiffs negligence must be compared to the negligence of the 
defendant. 
A plaintiff whose negligence is less than 50 percent of the total negligence causing 
the plaintiffs injuries may still recover compensation, but the amount will be reduced by the 
percentage of the plaintiffs negligence. If the plaintiffs negligence is equal to or greater than the 
negligence of the defendant, then the plaintiff may recover nothing. For example, if you find the 
plaintiffs negligence was 30 percent of all negligence causing the injuries, then the plaintiffs 
recovery will be reduced by 30 percent. On the other hand if you find the plaintiffs negligence is 
50 percent or greater, then the plaintiff will recover nothing. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
If you find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against one or both 
defendants, then it is your duty to award the plaintiff such damages, if any, that 
you find, from a preponderance of the evidence, will fairly and adequately 
compensate the plaintiff for the injury and damage sustained. The amount of 
such award may include the following: 
A. "Special Damages,'* or the reasonable value of medical care required 
for treatment of the plaintiff, as well as plaintiffs lost wages and out-of-pocket 
expenses. 
B. "General Damages," for pain, discomfort, and suffering both mental 
and physical. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA GILLMAN, SPECIAL VERDICT 
Plaintiff, CASE NO. 000907532 
vs. 
LOWELL H. ISOM, 
Defendant. Judge William B. Bohling 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions. If six of you are persuaded by the 
evidence in favor of the question presented, answer it "yes." If, on the question, six 
of you are not so persuaded, or if you are persuaded by the evidence against the 
question presented, answer it "no." 
1. Was the defendant negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes Y No 
(If you answered No. 1 above "no," then go no further and return to the 
courtroom ) 
-2-
2. If you answered No 1 above "yes," was such negligence a proximate 
cause of the accident? 
ANSWER: Yes ' No 
J 
(If you answered No. 2 above "no," then go no further and return to the 
courtroom.) 
3. Was the plaintiff negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
U 
4. If you answered No. 3 above "yes," was such negligence a proximate 
cause of the accident? 
ANSWER: Yes \ No 
\5 
5. If you answered "yes" to Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 above, then what 
percentage of the negligence should be allocated to defendant, and what percentage 
of negligence should be allocated to plaintiff? 
Plaintiff /0 % 
Defendant _32_% 
(Total must equal 100%) 
-3-
6. What amount would fairly compensate plaintiff for the injuries 
proximately caused by the accident? 
Special Damages $ J" 1ISf -
General Damages $ ' L'< 000 
Dated this ^ day of April, 2002. 
f t 
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31A-22-309 INSURANCE CODE 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Limitation of policy covering driver 
Motorcycle driven by insured 
Out-of-state incidents 
Cited 
Limitation of policy covering driver. 
Passenger in an automobile driven by in-
sured's son but owned by another person was 
not entitled to personal injury protection (PIP) 
coverage under a policy covering the driver 
McCaffery v Grow, 787 P2d 901 (Utah Ct App 
1990) 
Motorcycle driven by insured. 
The coverage described in § 31A-22-307 was 
applicable to an msured killed while ridmg a 
motorcycle involved m an accident in this state 
with a motor vehicle, there is no requirement 
that the insured must be operating or occupy-
ing the motor vehicle to be subject to coverage 
but only that he be in an accident involving a 
motor vehicle Coates v American Economy 
Ins Co , 627 P2d 92 (Utah 1981) y 
Out-of-state incidents. 
In light of language limiting apphcation of 
former provisions to accidents in this state 
insurance commissioner's regulation making 
no-fault insurance coverage applicable to inci-
dents occurring outside the state was in error 
1ML Freight, Inc v Ottosen, 538 P2d 296 
(Utah 1975), Neel v State, 889 P2d 922 (Utah 
L995), overruled on other grounds 
Cited m Pennington v Allstate Ins Co , 973 
P2d 932 (Utah 1998) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — What constitutes "entering" or 
"alighting from" vehicle within meaning of in-
surance policy, or statute mandating insurance 
coverage, 59 A L R 4th 149 
31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to 
personal injury protection, 
(1) (a) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under 
a policy which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a 
cause of action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged 
to have been caused by an automobile accident, except where the person 
has sustained one or more of the following. 
(i) death; 
(ii) dismemberment; 
(hi) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon 
objective findings; 
(iv) permanent disfigurement; or 
(v) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. 
(b) Subsection (l)(a) does not apply to a person making an uninsured 
motorist claim. 
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this 
part may only exclude from this coverage benefits: 
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while occupying another 
motor vehicle owned by or furnished for the regular use of the insured 
or a resident family member of the insured and not insured under the 
policy; 
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the 
insured motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the 
insured or while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle; 
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his 
injury: 
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or 
(B) while committing a felony; 
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(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of 
any motor vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises; 
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war, 
insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or to any act or condition 
incident to any of the foregoing; or 
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, 
or other hazardous properties of nuclear materials, 
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which 
may be contained in other types of coverage. 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307 are 
reduced by: 
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a 
result of an accident covered in this code under any workers' compensation 
or similar statutory plan; and 
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive 
from the United States or any of its agencies because that person is on 
active duty in the military service. 
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy, 
including those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given by 
the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident. 
(5) (a) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be 
made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. 
(b) Benefits for any period are overdue if they are not paid within 30 
days after the insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of 
expenses incurred during the period. If reasonable proof is not supplied as 
to the entire claim, the amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue 
if not paid within 30 days after that proof is received by the insurer. Any 
part or all of the remainder of the claim that is later supported by 
reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid within 30 days after the proof 
is received by the insurer. 
(c) If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when due, these expenses 
shall bear interest at the rate of 1 Vi% per month after the due date. 
(d) The person entitled to the benefits may bring an action in contract 
to recover the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the insurer is 
required by the action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the 
insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant. 
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to 
the following: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally 
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits 
required under personal injury protection have been paid by another 
insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund created under Chap-
ter 33, the insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall 
reimburse the other insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the 
amount of damages recoverable; and 
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount 
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-309, enacted by ch. 222, § 5; 2001, ch. 59, § 3. 
I* 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 160; Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amend-
1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 10, § 10; 1991, ch. 74, ment, effective May 1,2000, substituted "Work-
§ 8; 1992, ch. 230, § 9; 1994, ch. 4, § 1; 2000, ersJ Compensation Fund created under Chapter 
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surance coverages required by this act applicable, however, only to claims 
of the insured. 
(5) Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to prohibit an in-
surance policy from providing coverage for any nonmedical remedial treat-
ment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method of healing. 
Section 7. Application of coverage. 
(1) The coverages described in section 6 of this act shall be applicable to: 
(a) Personal injuries sustained by the insured when injured in an accident 
in this state involving any motor vehicle. 
(b) Personal injuries arising out of automobile accidents occuring in this 
s tate sustained by any other natural person while occupying the described 
motor vehicle with the consent of the insured or while a pedestrian if injured 
in an accident involving the described motor vehicle. 
(2) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy, 
including those complying with this act, primary coverage shall be afforded 
by the policy insuring the motor vehicle out of the use of which the accident 
arose 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under section 6 of this act 
shall be reduced by: 
(a) Any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a 
result of an accident covered in this act under any workmen's compensation 
plan or any similar statutory plan; and 
(b) Any amounts which tha t person receives or is entitled to receive from 
the United States or any of its agencies because of military enlistment, duty 
or service. 
Section 8. Payment of benefits. 
Payment of the benefits provided for in section 6 of this act shall be made 
on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. Benefits for any period are 
overdue if not paid within 35 days after the insurer receives reasonable 
proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during the period If 
reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the amount sup-
ported by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 35 days after such 
proof is received by the insurer. Any part or all of the remainder of the claim 
that is later supported by reasonable proof is also overdue if riot paid 
within 35 days after such proof is received by the insurer. In the event the 
insurer fails to pay such expenses when due, the amount of these expenses 
shall bear interest at the rate of 1-1/2% per month after the due date, and 
the person entitled to such benefits may bring an action in contract to 
recover these expenses plus the applicable interest. If the insurer is required 
by such action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the insurer shall 
also be required to pay a reasonable attorney's fees to the claimant. 
Section 9. Exceptions to limitations on damage claims. 
(1) No person for whom direct benefit coverage is provided for in this act 
shall be allowed to maintain a cause of action for general damages arising 
out of personal injuries alleged to have been caused by an automobile ac-
cident except where there has been caused by this accident any one or more 
of the following: 
(a) Death, 
(b) Dismemberment or fracture; 
[145] Insurance Ch. 55 
(c) Permanent disability; 
(d) Permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) Medical expenses to a person in excess of $500. 
(2) The owner of a motor vehicle with respect to which security is required 
by this act who fails to have such security in effect at the time'of an accident 
shall have no immunity from tort liability and shall be personally liable for 
the payment of the benefits provided for under section 6 of this act. 
Section 10. Exclusive benefits. 
(1) Any insurer may exclude benefits: 
(a) (i) For injury sustained by the injured while occupying another motor 
vehicle owned by the insured and not insured under the policy, or (ii) for an 
injury sustained by any person while operating the insured motor vehicle 
without the express or implied consent of the insured or while not in lawful 
possession of the insured motor vehicle. 
(b) To any injured person, if such person's conduct contributed to his in-
jury under any of the following circumstances: 
(i) Causing injury to himself intentionally; or 
(ii) While committing a felony. 
Section 11. Conditions insurers to abide by. 
(1) Every insurer authorized to write the insurance required by this act 
shall agree as a condition to being allowed to continue to write insurance in 
the State of Utah: 
(a) That where its insured is or would be held legally liable for the per-
sonal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits required under this 
act have been paid by another insurer, including the state insurance fund, it 
will reimburse such other insurer for the payment of such benefits, but not 
in excess of the amount of damages so recoverable, and 
(b) That the issue of liability for such reimbursement and the amount of 
same shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the in-
surers. 
Section 12. Departmental authorization. 
The department is authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations 
as may be necessary for the purposes of this act. 
Section 13. Violation a misdemeanor Security identification card—-
Enforcement. 
(1) Any owner of a motor vehicle with respect to which a security is 
required under this act, who operates this vehicle or permits it to be 
operated on a public highway in this state without this security being in ef-
fect is guilty of a misdemeanor. Any other person who operates such motor 
vehicle upon a public highway in this state with the knowledge that the 
owner does not have such security in effect is also guilty of a misdemeanor. 
(2) (a) Every person while driving a motor vehicle with respect to which a 
security is required under this act shall have in his possession evidence of 
such security being in effect, which evidence may be in the form of an iden-
tification card approved by the department for issuance by an insurer to its 
insured in respect to the motor vehicle. The driver shall display such eviden-
